![]() ![]() ![]() One original paradigm allowing to explore this question was developed by Mack et al. Are these aberrant positive percepts a result of mistakenly applied mechanisms of selective attention, therefore causing ignition of inappropriate perceptual representations or are these “normal hallucinations” created by mechanisms responsible for contentful perception apart from attention mechanisms? Recently, for example, it has been proposed that hallucinations are related to mind wandering ( Fazekas, 2021), which suggests that attention may be involved indeed as the wandering mind is by no means a well-focused mind. However, there are also contexts where subjects in a normal state of mind experience objects that are not actually present ( Aru and Bachmann, 2017 Aru et al., 2018 Vetik et al., 2020). Hallucinations belong to the generally acknowledged symptoms in the diagnosis of pathological neuropsychiatric conditions (despite that for the specialists, there is no clarity in distinguishing norm and pathology- Larøi, 2012 Rodríguez-Testal et al., 2021) and are often exclusively associated with illness. I will leave these levels of scrutiny aside for the time being. For additional subtleties in specifying illusions, see also Todorović (2020). This is depending on the relative share of illusory distortion between object and its separate features and on how the hallucinatory surplus additions to experience apply to object and/or its separate features ( Macpherson and Batty, 2016). Borrowing from Macpherson and Batty (2016), we will stick to these two traditional definitions: (1) Illusion: you perceive an object but you misperceive one or more of its properties (2) Hallucination: you have an experience as of an object and its properties but there is no object, and there are no properties, that you perceive in virtue of having that experience It must be noted, however, that the taxonomy of nonveridical experiences constituted by illusions and hallucinations is actually more fine-grained, leading possibly to more than 10 subtypes of nonveridicality. In the domain of nonveridical sensory experience, there is a principal difference between two types of nonveridicality. Circumstances leading to hallucinatory experiences belong to this set of contexts. Typically, overload of attention, extreme brevity of object in view, presence of noise, specific (biasing) context, sensory deprivation, idiosynchratic traits, and pathological state of the perceiver are the circumstances prone to cause perceptual illusions and other distortions of perceptual experience ( Behrendt and Young, 2004 Collerton et al., 2005 Friston, 2005 Bell et al., 2006 Meppelink et al., 2010 Bachmann et al., 2011 Ward, 2013 Nour and Nour, 2015 O'Callaghan et al., 2017 Corlett et al., 2019 Horga and Abi-Dargham, 2019 Coren and Girgus, 2020). In subjective perception, for example, some feature of an object can be nonveridically associated with some other feature of a different object, called the feature misbinding effect where illusory objects are experienced ( Treisman and Schmidt, 1982 Wu et al., 2004 Zhang et al., 2014). However, there are some contexts where veridical perception is disturbed and replaced by nonveridical conscious experience-the process by which the actually presented sensory signals that carry information about the objects becomes disturbed and turn to represent these objects nonveridically. The better we attend, the better we perceive and safeguard adequate reactions. While driving a car, we correctly see the road ahead and other cars moving (How could we otherwise survive). Usually, people perceive what is out there veridically 1. ![]()
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